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In Bank. Dec. 24. 1953.]

ROSEMOND M. PHILLIPS, Plaintiff and Appellant. T.
GEORGE W. PHILLIPS. Defendant and Appelluut.
[1] Mandamus - Judgment - Oonclusiveness.- Where wife's petition for writ of mandate to compel clerk of superior court to
enter memorandum of trial judge iII divorce action as a judgnlent was denied by Supreme Court without opinion. such
decision does not bar consideration of' wife's eontclltions, on
husband's subsequent appeal from judgment entered about
three years after memorandum was filed. that only valid
judgment was that rendered on date memorandum was filed
and that consequently bushand's notice of appeal was filed
too late.
[2] Trial-Findings-Signing and Filing.-When findings of fnct
are required and have not been filed, judgment is not renderl'd
until findings have been signed by trial judge and flll'd with
clerk.
[8] JUdgments-£ntry.-Once a judgment has been rendel'ed it
is duty of clerk to enter judgment in judgment book. (Code
.civ. Proc., § 632.}
[4] Id.-B.endition.-Memorandum of trial judge meets requirements for rendition of a judgment where it is signed by him,
. filed with clerk, entered in clerk's minutes, contains findings
of fact and conclusions of law separately stntcd. and complies
with Code Civ. Proc., § 632.
'
[2] See Oal.Jur., Trial. ~ 196; Am.Jur., Trinl. § 1136.
[3] See Cal.Jur.• Judgments, § 34; Am.Jur .. JUdgments, § 71.
MeK. Dig. References: t1] Mandamus, § IOU' [2] Trial. § 308;
[3,5,9J Judgments, § 70; [4J JUdgments, § 64; [01 Trinl, § 373;
{7] Appeal and Error, § 23; (8] Appeal and Enor. § 3S!); [10]
Appeal and Enor, ~ 261; [11] Jndgml'nts, l\ 79; [121 Appell I nnd
Error, § 1068; [13] Appeal and Enor, § 254; [14-16] Dh·oJ.'ce,
§ 60; [17] Divorce, § 195•
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[6] Id.-Entry.-Until a judgment is entered, it is not effectual
for any purpose (Code Civ. Proc., § 664), and at any time
before it is entered, court may change its conclusions of law
and enter a judgment different from that first announced.
[6] Trial-Findings-Amendments.-A judge who has heard the
evidence may at any time before entry of judgment amend
or change his findings of fact.
[7] Appeal-Appellate Jurisdiction.-Want of jurisdiction in reviewing court over a premature appeal is absolute, and as
consent cannot confer jurisdiction, the defect cannot be
waived.
[8] Id.-E1iect of Void Appeal.-A premature notice of appeal
does not stay further proceedings in trial court, since an
appeal taken before entry of judgment does not confer jurisdiction on appellate court so as to divest trial court of
authority to take furtber proceedings.

)

[9] Judgments-Entry.-Where memorandum of trial judge was
not entered as a judgment, he had power to substitute new
findings of fact and conclusions of law and to enter a new
judgment.
[10] Appeal-Time to Appeal-Oommencement of Period-Entry
Nunc Pro Tunc.-Even if a judgment is entered flune pro
tunc, a party's right to appeal cannot be cut off by antedating
entry of judgment from which he desires to appeal.
(11) Judgments-Entry-Nunc Pro Tunc.-Courts have inherent
power to enter judgments flufle pro tunc so as to relate back
to time wben they should have been entered, but will do so
only to avoid injustice
(12] Appeal-Right to Allege Error-Respondent.-Ordinarily a
party who has not appealed may not complain of errors.
[1S] Id.-Time to Appeal-Commencement of Period-Rendition
or Entry of Judgment.-Where memorandum of trial judge
complied with Code Civ. Proc., § 632, and constituted a "rendition" of judgment, a party's notice of appeal, tiled thereafter
but prior to the entry of judgment, must be deemed to have
been filed immediately after entry of judgment. (Rules on
Appeal, role 2(c).)
[14] Divorce-Causes for Denying-Recrimination.-Doctrlne of
recrimination may not be mechanically applied by trial judge
in a divorce case but is an equitable principle to be 'followed
according to circumstances of each case and with a proper
respect for paramount interests of community at large.
[14] Recrimination as an absolute or qualified defense in divorce
causes, note, 170 A.L.R. 10713. See, also, Cal.Jur., Divorce and
Separation, § 58; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation.• § 233.

pec.1953]

)

PHILLIPS tI. PHILLIPS

871

[41 C.2d 869; 264 P .2d 926J

[15] Id.-Causes for Denying-Recrimination.-While trial court
necessarily has broad discretion in determining issue of recrimination in a divorce case, it must give consideration to
prospects of reconciliation, effect of marital conflict on husband, wife and third parties, and comparative fault of the
parties.
[16] Id.-Causes for Denying-Recrimination.-Doctrine of recrimination was inapplicable in a divorce case where both
parties agreed that a reconciliation was impossible; where trial
judge alluded to the "matrimonial wreck" and evidence sustained findings that husband frequently swore at and cursed
wife, that he became angry and objected to her course of conduct on numerous occasions, that he frequently expressed dissatisfaction with and belittled her in presence of guests and
friends, that after their second marriage following a former
divorce she made statements to friends that she had agreed to
reconciliation only because she hoped thereby to get most of his
money and property, that she took large sums of money from
his place of business, that she carried on a course of conduct
designed to irritate him. etc.: where seriousness and frequency of their misconduct and nature of charges made indicate very little possibility of their living together harmoniously; and where marital conflict had a serious effect on
them physically and financially.
[17] Id. - Temporary Alimony - Appeal. - Whether trial court
abused its discretion by reducing alimony pendente lite from
$350 per month during trial to $150 per month on appeal
will not be determined by Supreme Court where no appeal
was taken from order fixing amount to be paid pending appeal.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Placer
County. James Snell. Judge.- Reversed.
Action for a divorce to which defendant filed a cross-complaint for similar relief. Judgment denying each party a
divorce reversed.
Athearn, Chandler, Hoffman & Ange.ll, Reginald G. Hearn
and Angell. Hearn & Adams for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Chamberlain & Chamberlain, T. L. Chamberlain and F. L.
Sinclair for Defendant and Appellant.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Rosemond M. Phillips and defendant George W. Phillips were married in Mexico in 1934.
On their first wedding anniversary, they had another cere• A.ssigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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mony in California to allay any question as to the validity
of the marriage. In 1945 Rosemond secured an interlocutory
decree of divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, and a final
decree was entered in 1946. A reconciliation followed, and the
parties were remarried in May of that year. In July, 1948,
they again separated, and Rosemond brought this action for
divorce, alleging extreme cruelty. George denied the allegations of cruelty and filed a cross-complaint in which he prayed
in the alternative for an annulment on the ground of fraud
or for a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. Both
parties alleged that reconciliation was impossible.
The trial court restrained George from disposing of the
assets alleged to be community property and ordered him to
pay stated amounts for Rosemond's costs and attorney fees
and $300 per month alimony pendente lite. A few days later,
this order was changed to provide for $350 per month alimony pendente lite and to restrain Rosemond from living in
the family residence. Subsequently, the alimony was reduced
to $150 per month.
Following a trial, the court filed the following memorandum on October 4, 1949:
"The Court finds from the evidence introduced in this case:
u 1. That the defendant and cross-complainant has wrongfully inflicted upon the plaintiff and cross-defendant grievous
mental suffering.
"2. That the plaintiff and cross-defendant has wrongfully
inflicted upon the defendant and cross-complainant grievous
mental suffering.
"It therefore follows that neither party is entitled to a
divorce from the other.
"It is ordered that each party to this action be, and that
they are hereby denied a divorce from the other.
.
"JAMES SNELL"
The memorandum was entered in the clerk's minutes but
was not entered in the judgment book. Rosemond moved for
a new trial and her motion was denied on November 26, 1949.
On December 22, 1949, she filed a notice of appeal "from that
certain part of the judgment in said action rendered on the
4th day of October 1949 whereby the plaintiff is denied a divorce from the defendant." The District Court of Appeal
affirmed the "judgment" (Phillips v. Phillips, (Cal.App.)
236 P.2d 816), and this court granted a hearing. It was
thereafter ascertained that a judgment had never been entered. After communication by the clerk of this court with
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counsel and the arial court, new findings of fact and conclusions of law were signed by the trial judge and judgment
was entered on October 14, 1952. The judgment denied each
party a divorce on the same ground as did the memorandum
of October 4, 1949. George filed a notice of appeal therefrom
.on December 12, 1952. Rosemond did not file a second notice
of appeal.
Rosemond contends that George's appeal must be dismissed,
on the grounds that the only valid judgment herein was· the
one that was rendered on October 4, 1949, and that George's
notice of appeal, which was not filed untU December 8, 1952,
was filed too late.
Rosemond previously sought a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk of the Superior Court of Placer County to enter
the memorandum of October 4, 1949, as a judgment. [1] The
petition was denied by this court without opinion. (Phillips
v. Superior Court, Sac. 6345, December 4, 1952.) That decision does not bar consideration here of Rosemond's contentions. (See Funeral Directors Assn. v. Board of Funeral
Directors It EmbZamers, 22 Cal.2d 104, 110 [136 P.2d 785].)
In support of her motion to dismiss the appe&1, Rosemond
. contends that the written memorandum, signed and filed by
the trial judge, constituted and was intended by the court
to be a valid judgment disposing of the case. She states
that it was the ministerial duty of the clerk to enter the judgment immediately and that the clerk's dereliction cannot impair the finality of the judgment to her prejudice. She also
argues that the clerk of the trjal court and George have accepted the memorandum as a judgment and George cannot
now question it. Finally, she contends that the perfection of
her appeal stayed all further proceedings in the trial court.
[2] When, as here, findings of fact are required (LaMa,.
v. LaMar, 30 Ca1.2d 898, 900 [186 P.2d 678]) and have not
been waived, judgment is not rendered until the findings have
been signed by the trial judge and filed with the clerk. (Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 30 Ca1.2d 835, 347 [182
P.2d 182] : Supple v. Luckenbach, 12 Cal.2d 319, 323 [84 P.2d
52] ; Estate of Dodds, 52 Cal.App.2d 287, 289 [126 P.2d 150] ;
Easterly v. Cook. 140 Cal.App. 115, 123 [35 P.2d 164] ; see
29 Cal.L.Rev. 635, 687.) [3] Once the judgment has been
rendered it is the duty of the clerk to enter the judgment
in the judgment book. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632: Baker v.
Brickell, 102 Cal. 620. 623 [36 P. 950]; LaMar v. Superior
Courf,87 Cal.App.2d 126, 130 (196 P.2d 98] ; Hoover v. LeI-
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ter, 16 Cal.App. 151, 153 [116 P. 382].) [4) The memorandum that was signed by the trial judge, :filed with the
clerk, and entered in the clerk's minutes, contained findings
of fact and conclusions of law separately stated and complied
with section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Estate
of James, 18 Cal.2d 512, 514 [116 P.2d 438] ; Estate of Exterstein, 2 Cal.2d 13,15-16 [38 P.2d 151]; Consolidated 1rr. DiBt.
v. Cranshaw, 130 Cal.App. 455, 462 [20 P.2d 119].) The
filing of the memorandum, therefore, met the requirements
for rendition of a judgment.
[6] It does not follow, however, that the memorandum is
the judgment. Until a judgment is entered, it is not effectual
for any purpose (Code Ch,.. Proc., § 664), and at any time
before it is entered, the court may change its conclusions of
law and enter a judgment different from that first announced.
(Brownell v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 703, 708 [109 P. 91];
Crim v. Kessing, 89 Cal. 478, 489 [26 P. 1074, 23 Am.St.Rep.
491] ; Lind v. Baker, 48 Cal.App.2d 234, 244 [119 P.2d 806];
Tilden Lbr. Co. v. Bacon La""d Co., 116 Cal.App. 689.
694 [3 P.2d 350].) [6] :Moreover, a judge who has heard
the evidence may at any time before entry of judgment amend
or change his findings of fact. (Reimer v. Firpo, 94 Cal.App.
2d 79B. 800-801 [212 P.2d 23]; Magarian v. }foser, 5 Cal.
App.2d 20B. 210 [42 P.2d 3B5].)
['1] There is no merit to Rosemond's contention that since
George. the clerk. and the trial court accepted the memorandum as a judgment. its validity cannot now be questioned.
As this court stated in Spencer v. Troutt, 133 Cal. 605 [65
P. 1083], "the want of jurisdiction in this court over a premature appeal is absolute. and as consent cannot confer jurisdiction. the defect cannot be waived." (133 Cal. at 609; see
Fong Chuck v. Chin Po Foon, 29 Cal.2d 552, 554 [176 P.2d
705]: cf. Rules on Appeal, rule 2 (c).)
[8] The premature notice of appeal did not stay further
proceedings in the trial court. since an appeal taken before
entry of judgment does not confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court so as to divest the trial court of authority to take.
further proceedings. (Spencer v. Troutt, supra, 133 Cal. 605.
60B-609: Brady v. Burke, 90 Cal. 1, 5 [27 P. 52].) "Acts of
the trial court after the premature notice but before entry
of judgment are valid." (Witkin, New California Rules on
Appeal, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 79, 88.)
[9] Since the 1949 memorandum was not entered as a
judgment, the trial judge had the power to substitute new

/
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findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to enter a new
jUdgment. The only judgment in this case is the judgment
entered on October 14, 1952, and all issues in this case must
be resolved on the basis of that judgment.
Rosemond contends that even if the memorandum is not
the judgment herein, the judgment entered on October 14,
1952, should have been entered nunc pro tunc as of October
4, 1949, and for that reason also George's notice of appeal
was filed too late. Since George was apparently satisfied with
the purported judgment of October 4, 1949, and was willing
to allow severable parts thereof not appealed from by her
to become final and res judicata, she continues, it would give
him an unfair advantage to allow him to appeal from the
judgment subsequently entered.
The contention is wholly without merit. [10] Even if the
judgment were entered nunc pro tunc, a party's right to an
appeal cannot be cut off by antedating the entry of the judgment from which he desires to appeal. (Spencer v. Troutt,
supra, 133 Cal. 605, 607; Bryant v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.
App.2d 556, 561 [61 P.2d 483]; see 30 Cal.L.Rev. 433. 449.)
In any event, no reason has been shown why the judgment
should be entered as of 1949. [11] Courts have inherent
power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc so as to relate back
to the time when they should have been entered, but will
do so only to avoid injustice. (Norton v. Oity of Pomona,
{) Ca1.2d 54,62 [53 P.2d 952] ; Scoville v. Keglor, 29 Cal.App.
2d 66, 68 [84 P.2d 212] ; see Mather v. Mather, 22 Ca1.2d 713.
719 [140 P.2d 808].) In the present case, no "unfair
\dvantage" will be allowed George if he is permitted to show
that an adverse jUdgment is e'rroneous; he could change his
mind and decide to appeal after judgment was entered in
the case.
George has made a timely appeal from the judgment
as a whole and this court has thereby obtained jurisdiction to
review the entire judgment. [12] It is necessary, however,
to determine whether Rosemond has also appealed from the
judgment, since it is the general rule that a party who has
not appealed may not complain of errors. (Mott v. Horstmann, 36 Ca1.2d 388, 393 [224 P.2d 11]; Salter v. Ulrich,
22 Ca1.2d 263, 268 [138 P.2d 7, 146 A.L.R. 1344].) [13] Rosemond filed her notice of appeal on December 22, 1949. The
judgment was not entered until October 14, 1952, and she did
not file a second notice of appeal. Rule 2 (c) of the Rules on
Appeal, as it read before the 1951 amendment thereto, pro-
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vided: "A notice of appeal filed prior to entry of the judgment, but after its rendition, shall be valid and shall be
deemed to have been filed immediately after entry." As we
have previously pointed out, the memorandum complied with
section 632 of the Code of Civil Procedure and constituted
a "rendition" of judgment. Accordingly, Rosemond'8 notice
of appeal must be deemed to have been filed immediately after
entry of judgment.
The trial court found that each party had a cause of action
of divorce against the other on the ground of extreme cruelty
and denied each a divorce on the ground of recrimination.
(Civ. Code, § 122.) [14] The doctrine of recrimination may
not be mechanically applied by a trial judge, but it is an
equitable principle to be followed according to the circumstances of each case and with a proper respect for the paramount interests of the community at large. (De Burgh v.
De Burgh, 39 Ca1.2d 858, 870 [250 P.2d 598].) [15] The
trial court necessarily has a broad discretion. It must, however, give consideration to the prospects of reconciliation,
the effect of the marital conflict upon the husband, wife, and
third parties, and the comparative fault of the parties. (De
Burgh v. De Burgh, supra, 39 Cal.2d at 873.)
[16] We have concluded that the doctrine of recrimination does not apply here. Both parties agreed that a reconciliation was impossible. The trial judge himself alluded to
the "matrimonial wreck," observed that "I don't think it
will be pleasant for them both to live in the same house,"
and by court order restrained R{)semond from staying at the
family residence. .The trial court made detailed findings
concerning numerous acts of cruelty alleged in the complaint and in the answer and cross-complaint. It found that
George frequently swore at and cursed Rosemond, that he
became angry and objected to her course of conduct on
numerous occasions, that he frequently expressed dissatisfaction with and belittled her in the presence of guests and
friends, and that when Rosemond insisted that the family car
have new tires before making a proposed trip to Oakland.
George became angry and told her, "I hope you break your
God damn neck." It found that after the second marriage
Rosemond made statements to friends indicating that she had
agreed to the reconciliation only because she hoped thereby
to get most of George's money and property; that Rosemond
took large sums of money from the place of business George
operated at Lake Tahoe without his consent; that she earried
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on a course of conduct designed to irritate and provoke him;
that she was discourteous and disrespectful to patrons and
guests at the place of business at Lake Tahoe, causing such
patrons and guests to state to George that they would take
their business elsewhere; that she criticized and embarrassed
George in the presence of friends; and that she told their
friends on many occasions that he was crazy. The findings
are supported by substantial evidence.
This marriage is the second between the parties that has
failed. The seriousness and frequency of their misconduct
and the nature of the charges made at the trial, including the
many unfounded accusations that were made by both parties
and found to be false by the trial judge, indicate that there
is little possibility that they will ever be able to overcome
their differences and live together harmoniously. The marital
conflict has a serious effect upon the parties. George suffers
from a heart condition, for which he receives disability compensation, and continued discord may have harmful results.
Financial considerations may not be entirely ignored, and it
appears that the conduct of the parties may destroy the
business of the resort and their livelihood.
It is clear from the evidence and the findings that
the legitimate objects of the marriage have been destroyed.
No public policy would be served by denying a divorce because
each party was guilty of extreme cruelty toward the other.
It is a degradation of marriage and a frustration of its purposes to use it as a means of punishing the parties to the
divorce action. In our opinion. the trial judge should not
have denied the parties a divorce on the ground that recrimination had been shown. The judgment must therefore be
reversed. On retrial, the court may determine whether one
or both parties shall receive the divorce. (De Burgh v. De
Burgh, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 858, 873.)
George contends that the trial court should be directed to
enter judgment that a certain purported' agreement between
him and Rosemond is void and that there is no community
property. Rosemond contends that the trial court should be
directed to enter jUdgment that the agreement is valid and
that all their property is community. These questions were
put in issue by the pleadings, but since the trial court denied
both parties a divorce, it did not resolve them. Since the
judgment must be reversed, these issues will be decided on the
retrial of the cause.
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[17] Rosemond contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by reducing alimony pendente lite from $350 per
month during the trial to $150 per month on appeal. Since
no appeal was taken from the order fixing the amount to be
paid pending appeal, we are without jurisdiction to review
that order.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The judgment
is reversed.

Gibson, O. J., Oarter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J .-1 would affirm the judgment for the reasons stated by me in De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Oa1.2d 858,
874 [250 P.2d 598].
Spence, J., concurred.
SHENK, J .-1 dissent. However desirable a change in
the public policy of this state on the subject of recrimination
may be thought to be, I feel impelled to adhere to the views
stated by me in De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Ca1.2d 858, 882
[250 P.2d 598]. The legislature established the state policy
in 1872 by the enactment of section 111 of the Civil Code
where it is provided that: .. Divorce must be denied upon
showing . . . 4. Recrimination." That policy continued until
1952 when this court in the De Burgh case ruled otherwise.
The Legislature has the first right to establish the public policy
of the state. When it has spoken on a subject so peculiarly
within its dominion and in no uncertain terms it is incompetent for the court to declare otherwise.
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